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Technically, there is an easy solution to the UK crisis of housing supply: find 
more land for housing. This is not a physical problem but a political one. The land 
is there but policies and habits of thought prevent its use, while incentives are 
counter-productive.
This paper sets out a new approach to lining up incentives to set the country on 
the right tracks for solving the housing crisis in a way that would be to everyone’s 
advantage. To achieve this policy magic there are four ingredients: 
1. Release for development all Green Belt or agricultural land within 
800 metres of any stations which have a service of 45 minutes or 
less to a major city, if, but only if, that land has no marker of amenity 
or environmental value; so no building on National Parks, Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty or public recreational areas, for example.
2. Introduce a Land Development Charge set at 20 per cent of the market 
value of all new development when sold. All proceeds of the charge 
would be used exclusively for identified purposes to ensure the local 
community’s facilities and infrastructure improve and there is generous 
funding for social housing.
3. Give the newly-created ‘development rights’ to the land around stations 
to the companies — such as National Rail, Transport for London, Crossrail 
or Transport for Greater Manchester1 — which own the infrastructure 
and stations. Then require them to set up new, specialist development 
companies to which the development rights would pass. Since only 
these development companies would be able to develop the land, they 
would be able to buy it cheaply with just some reasonable mark-up on 
agricultural value. At the same time design a careful tapering down of 
public subsidy to the rail companies so they are incentivised to ensure 
the land is efficiently developed in the public interest.
4. Set up a Green Development Corporation (GDC) — specially designed 
Urban Development Corporations — for each city region. Drawing on 
the experience of the redevelopment of London’s Docklands, give these 
GDCs full planning powers over the land released for development. This 
1 Not the franchised train companies since they do not have a long-term commitment to either the infrastructure or the train 
services.
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would make it possible to make quick decisions and take a strategic 
view of how best to develop all the new land and so maximise both the 
environmental and social benefits of the development. The latter would 
notably include optimising and improving the use of the rail system. The 
GDCs could be set up under the Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 19802 and could also be responsible for how the revenue from the 
Land Development Charge raised from developing the land is spent.
The benefits of this approach are clear: 
• The amount of land unlocked is large: an estimated 47,000 hectares in 
just five city regions. That alone would provide enough land to increase 
the housing stock by 7 to 9 per cent. It would take only 1.8 per cent of 
existing Green Belt land while providing some 4,700 hectares of new and 
accessible green space: that is an area 15 times the size of Hampstead 
Heath and considerably bigger than Sherwood Forest. And, whilst this 
paper sets out a worked example of the proposal for five city regions, the 
idea is applicable to all our large cities with Green Belts. 
• These new homes would be of high quality. The real price of land for 
houses has risen more than 15-fold since Green Belts were first imposed 
and land for urban expansion dried up. The result is far too much money 
goes into land — creating no community or productive value — and not 
enough into design and build quality. Land for housing is so expensive 
because it is in such short supply. This proposal would make land prices 
fall. If land prices were lower and design guides well worked out, then 
new housing would be much higher quality. This would help make it more 
welcome to its host communities. 
• These new homes would be much more environmentally friendly too. 
They would meet modern insulation standards and not be the typical 
car-orientated developments currently built and by offering shorter 
commuting times to employment centres, thereby imposing lower  
carbon footprints.  
• Lastly, this proposal would redirect the land-value increases to fund (i) rail 
services and (ii) better local infrastructure, services and social housing. 
Currently, when land gets planning permission for housing, its price rises 
extravagantly, and these windfall gains go to the lucky landowners. Under 
this new approach, land-value gains would be deployed for the social 
good rather than private enrichment; and at the same time make new 
development more attractive to local communities. Capturing land-value 
uplift to finance commuter rail has a substantial history of success. It is, 
for example, used to fund the Hong Kong mass transit system making it 
among the most efficient in the world and one of the very few that does 
not rely on public subsidy.3  
2 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/65/section/135
3 Suzuki, H., Murakami J, Hong Y-H, and Tamayose B. (2015) ‘Financing Transit-Oriented Development with Land Values’, World 
Bank: Urban Development Series.
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This paper sets out a new idea for solving the UK housing crisis: a crisis that is 
corroding social and inter-generational cohesion and at the same time making 
regional inequality far worse, reducing national economic performance. It is also 
of course, increasing homelessness as well as making people live in inadequate 
housing in places they would not necessarily choose to live. 
In England, the real price of houses has nearly doubled in every decade4 since 
supply of urban land was frozen by the introduction of Green Belts in 1955. In a 
world where house prices double in real terms every decade there is a powerful 
incentive to be a homeowner. Miss out at the age of 25 and one risks permanent 
exclusion from the housing wealth ladder provided by ever rising house prices. 
Home-ownership steadily rose from 32 per cent in 1953 to around 70 per cent in 
the early 2000s, but has now dropped back to less than 64 per cent. For people 
born in the 1950s the homeownership rate exceeded 70 per cent before they got 
to 34.5 In the 12 years to 2016, however, homeownership rates for the under 34s 
have fallen from 59 per cent to 34 per cent and have since fallen further. Younger 
people have been priced out of ownership.
If house prices were stable over time, not owning a house would not add to 
inequality or hamper mobility. Germany and Switzerland, for example, have 
sensible planning and local tax systems and they build enough houses to satisfy 
demand: so over 50 years house prices have been stable in real terms and half 
or, in Switzerland, more than half the population, choose to rent. In contrast, in 
England 62 per cent of all personal assets are in the form of housing. So rising 
prices redistribute to owner occupiers and the old.
4 Cheshire, P., Nathan M. and Overman H. (2014) ‘Urban Economics and Urban Policy: Challenging Conventional Policy 
Wisdom’, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
5 Cribb J., Hood A. and Joyce R. (2016) ‘The economic circumstances of different generations: The latest picture’, London: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
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The 2003 Barker Report on housing concluded there was a real problem of 
housing affordability in the UK, which would cause social discord as well as 
welfare and economic loss.6 The simplest measure of housing affordability is 
the ratio of median house prices to median incomes. A ratio of three is widely 
regarded as the upper limit of affordability. Between 1996 and 2003 the ratio in 
England and Wales had worsened from 3.84 to 5.83. By 2018 it stood at 7.8.7 
While all UK cities are now above the affordability threshold set out in the Barker 
Report, the epicentre of unaffordability is in the South and East of England. 
In 2018 the most affordable — or more accurately — least unaffordable local 
authority in the area south of the line from The Wash to Bristol, was Peterborough, 
where the ratio was 6.79. In Bristol, itself, the ratio was 8.74, in Cambridge 12.95 
and in Oxford, 11.12. The least unaffordable London Borough was Tower Hamlets 
with a ratio of 9.84 but in a quite ordinary borough, like Ealing, it was 15.54. In 
contrast, in the major cities elsewhere in the country, the two most affordable 
were Liverpool and Hull with ratios of respectively 4.0 and 4.36; but others, like 
Leeds (6.27), or York (8.86), were very clearly unaffordable.
Apart from the intergenerational inequality and lack of access to decent housing, 
this also causes clear economic costs. Regional differentials in house prices 
mean that to move from a declining to a prosperous labour market one has to 
be very young. Once on the housing ladder in Hull or Liverpool there will be no 
chance of finding equivalent housing in a place with better access to well-paid 
jobs. So it becomes more difficult for individuals to offset for regional inequalities 
by moving, and regional adjustment is made more difficult as local economies 
grow or decline. Equally the supply of labour is choked off in those labour markets 
where people would be most productive. The booming modern economies of 
Cambridge or Bristol cannot expand because house prices deter people from 
moving there. People are trapped in less productive places, or else they have to 
commute inordinate distances.
The root of the problem is building too few houses over more than a generation 
and building the wrong sorts of houses in the wrong places. The scale of the 
housing supply shortfall in England can be highlighted by comparing the actual 
number of houses built in the last 30 years to the number built in the previous 30 
years, 1959 to 1988. Between 1959 and 1988, approximately 7.5 million homes 
were built, whereas only 3.3 million homes were built in the last 30 years. This 
suggests a total shortfall of 3.1 million homes.  
6 Barker, K. (2003) ‘Review of Housing Supply: Securing our Future Housing Needs: Interim Report – Analysis’, London: HMSO.
7 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/housing/bulletins/housingaffordabilityinenglandandwales/2018 
5Centre for Cities • Homes on the right tracks • September 2019
And there was even more systematic undersupply where demand was strongest 
— where people were trying to move to and where they wanted to buy more 
space in homes. For example, over the nearly 40 years from 1980 to 2018, 
56,340 houses were built in Barnsley and Doncaster combined, while population 
increased in those cities by 22,796. In contrast, in Oxford and Cambridge only 
29,430 houses were built but population grew by 95,079.
Homes do not only vary in their location. As people get richer, they try to buy 
better houses and better houses are roomier; they have a garden; they are semi-
detached, even detached, hence requiring more land. This is clear when looking 
at what has happened over the long term in the Greater London area. It is claimed 
that, of course, house prices have risen because population has increased so 
fast. Migration is even blamed. Look at the facts however and one finds that 
between 1951 and 1981, when London’s population fell by 17 per cent, still real 
house prices increased by 72 per cent. And, over the whole period 1951 to 2011 
London’s population hardly increased at all — up by 0.1 per cent, but real house 
prices over the same period rose a staggering 463 per cent. It was rising real 
incomes pressing against a fixed area of land that drove this. 
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The housing crisis is a symptom of a wider crisis for English society and for 
economic progress. The next chapter shows how it could be possible to hugely 
increase both the social and environmental value of the Green Belt. The low 
social and environmental value of large tracts of Green Belt land is a reality and 
underpins the proposal in this paper. Then, after outlining the proposal, Chapter 
3 shows how much land of little environmental or amenity value there is available 
close to commuter stations. Building on this land would have no negative social 
or environmental impact. Chapter 4 suggests how substantial funds for rail 
services, social housing, infrastructure, and services for the local community 
could be raised from allowing development of land around stations before then 
outlining a mechanism for developing that land in an environmentally positive 
way. 
If the housing problem stems from persistently, over more than a generation, not 
building enough houses and not building them in the right places, what underlies 
this failure? Why can other countries build enough houses and still have stringent 
environmental protection? 
Green Belts are the primary cause behind the UK  
housing problem
There are multiple policy failures damaging housing supply,8 but the lack of land 
where there is demand for housing is critical. 
It is not that England has a shortage of suitable land but, with the introduction 
of Green Belts in 1955, policy deliberately froze the supply of land available for 
housing around our major cities. 
The idea of Green Belts may have started as ‘green lungs for cities’ but as 
implemented in 1955 that was not their purpose. Being called Green Belts makes 
them sound as if they are to provide recreational or amenity land for public 
8 To name just some of these other causes there is the politicisation of planning decisions enabling NIMBYism. There are tight 
regulations which make building high very difficult. Our system of local government finance in effect fines local communities 
if they allow development: they have an obligation to provide services but get very little extra revenue. In this paper resolving 
the land supply bottleneck is the focus, although the proposed Land Development Charge would provide a needed incentive 
to local communities to accept development.
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enjoyment. This is unfortunately not true. The name is rhetorically powerful 
because it borrows the positive connotations of the original idea and it certainly 
sounds ‘green’.
Rather, the purpose of Green Belts as they have existed since 1955 is to prevent 
building: to stop ‘settlements’ merging. As Duncan Sandys, the Minister of 
Housing, wrote when imposing the Metropolitan Green Belt: “even if... neither 
green nor particularly attractive scenically, the major function of the Greenbelt 
was... to stop further urban development”.9  That remains their function as 
confirmed in the National Policy Planning Framework of 2012 and again in 2019. 
The purpose of Green Belts is to be empty spaces between cities, originally 
to protect the Home Counties from the encroachment of London and force 
urban expansion to jump over Surrey or Hertfordshire to Northamptonshire, 
Cambridgeshire or Hampshire.
Preserving land that offers public benefits is vital, but 
that is not what Green Belts are for 
Britain is in no danger of being ‘concreted over’. Across England’s regions, the 
Generalised Land Use Data of 2005 showed that the proportion that was not built 
on — farmland, forest or park but not including gardens or water — varied from 38 
per cent in the Greater London Authority area to 91 per cent in the North East or 
South West. Many people find this difficult to believe: but satellite imagery and 
modern GIS measurement show it is true. Even English cities are green: gardens 
on average take up half the ‘built-up space’. 
Furthermore, Britain was one of the pioneers in preserving environmentally 
valuable land such as scarce habitats and scenically beautiful land from 
development. There are good reasons for this. Such land provides a public good 
which markets would not effectively provide. That is why the UK has National 
Parks, Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), Nature Reserves, Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) and, of course, land managed by the National 
Trust and parks for recreational use. Most of these designations are designed 
not just to preserve the landscape but to improve access to the countryside. The 
exceptions here are some land preserved for habitat where understandably the 
interests of wildlife may dominate and AONB land where access is only on public 
footpaths. The land preserved from development in all these ways generates 
public benefits that markets left to themselves would not deliver.
In contrast, most Green Belt land is privately owned, without public access and 
its biggest use is as intensive arable farming. Some 74 per cent of Green Belt land 
in Cambridge, 54 per cent for York, 44 per cent for Nottingham and Oxford and 39 
and 37 per cent respectively for Birmingham or London is used for this purpose. 
Intensive farmland is far from green because intensive farming is one of the most 
environmentally damaging of all land uses.10 
Moreover, the total area of Green Belts is very large and has changed very 
little over time; they cover nearly one-and-a-half times as much land as all 
development. In 2005, 47,300 hectares of the Bournemouth Green Belt was 
9  Hall, P.G. (1975) ‘Urban and Regional Planning’, Harmondsworth/London: Penguin.
10  Firbank, L., Bradbury R., McCracken D., Stoate C., Goulding K., Harmer R. and Williams P. (2011) ‘Enclosed Farmland’, The UK 
National Ecosystem Assessment Technical Report. UK National Ecosystem Assessment. Cambridge: UNEP-WCMC.
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transferred to the New Forest National Park giving it even greater protection from 
development. If that area is not counted as ‘lost’ and so is subtracted from the 
previous total, the total Green Belt area grew from 1,605,000 hectares in 1997 to 
1,630,000 hectares in 2018 — only a miniscule fall from the peak of 1,640,000 in 
2011.
Because it is not possible to build houses on Green Belt land, there is little 
competition, so golf courses proliferate. The area of golf courses in Surrey is 
considerably greater than the area covered by houses and other domestic 
buildings.11 And in the Greater London Authority area, where 35,200 hectares or 
23 per cent of the land is Green Belt, the area of golf courses is more than twice 
that of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.12 
These things together suggest that, currently, public benefits for just Green Belt 
designation are, at best, very limited.
A different approach to Green Belt land would offer 
larger public benefits
Some time ago, in the search for sensible places to allow building, two people 
independently came up with the idea of building on land around stations giving 
easy access to London.13 The Green Belt, however, is fiercely defended by some 
people — especially home-owners who live within it — and its blanket protection is 
the very reason some influential lobbies exist. Opposition to building on parts of 
it is fading but nevertheless persists, and the idea has not yet got into policy.
Apart from there being far too little of it, there are at least two problems with new 
housing. Nearly all new housing developments are on a relatively small scale, a 
scale far too small to justify new rail investment: so it tends to be car orientated, 
clogging up local roads and adding to the carbon footprint.14 This helps generate 
a second related problem: how to pay for an efficient rail system. Railways, 
especially commuter rail with its problems of peak usage, cannot survive on fares 
alone. As things stand they need subsidy. Successive governments have been 
struggling with that problem since the 1980s.
The purpose of the proposal set out in this paper is to address these problems, 
while enhancing the value of Green Belt land: both its value to individuals, but 
also its social and environmental value. People would greatly value a better 
chance of finding a home they could afford, in places giving good access to jobs 
they want. That much is obvious and would be a private benefit. But new houses, 
of which presently the UK builds so few, are much more energy efficient than 
older ones, so over time just more building would reduce the carbon footprint – 
bringing social benefits as well. 
11  Cheshire, P. (2014) ‘Turning houses into gold: don’t blame the foreigners, it’s we Brits who did it’, CentrePiece, Spring.
12  London First (2015) ‘The Green Belt: A place for Londoners?’, London: London First
13  Barney Stringer of QUOD https://barneystringer.wordpress.com/2014/06/17/is-the-green-belt-sustainable/  and Paul 
Cheshire of LSE  http://spatial-economics.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/building-on-greenbelt-land-so-where.html
14 Northstowe, a development on a former RAF airfield 8km outside Cambridge, is one of the largest current residential projects 
in England. Initiated in 2003 and with completion expected by 2030, there are planned to be 10,000 homes. Enough to 
justify investment in a guided busway: far too little to justify rail investment.
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These benefits would be much larger than those of current developments. 
By focusing development in many, often larger communities, around existing 
commuter stations, the proposal provides both an incentive to ensure rail use is 
maximised and a planning process that would guarantee it without the need to 
build new infrastructure. It would take existing intensive farmland in the Green 
Belt around stations, it is true, but there is currently limited access to that land 
and, because intensive agriculture is so environmentally destructive, there would 
be a net environmental gain just by not intensively farming it. Gardens have far 
greater biodiversity as well as providing family-friendly, accessible green space 
to enjoy. Furthermore, the proposal requires that 10 per cent of all the buildable 
land identified should not be built on but reserved as public open space and 
parks, so there would be a net addition to valuable green space and more wildlife 
habitat.
A more subtle environment gain would also come from bringing people closer 
to where they worked. Green Belts may be defended as an instrument of 
‘containment’ but sadly this is not true. Not only do they prevent people living 
within easy commuting distance of better-paid and more-productive jobs but, 
in their search for affordable housing space, people jump over them. Changes 
in commuting patterns between 2001 and 2011 reveal this. Ultra-long distance 
commuting for people with jobs in central London has systematically increased. 
The mean distance from London Zone 1 of the 10 wards with the biggest 
proportionate increase in employed residents commuting to London was 166km, 
a round trip of 332km per day.
If there were cheaper, better, greener and more plentiful housing around 
commuter stations, people would be able to choose shorter commuting 
distances: both a private and a social/environmental benefit.
10
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Using land in the socially and environmentally best way, not just slavishly 
following arbitrary designations, together with aligning incentives, is the solution 
to the UK housing supply crisis. What this means in practice is releasing more 
land for high-quality homes, doing so with no environmental damage and ensuring 
the benefits of the land-use changes flow back to the local communities.
Releasing Green Belt around stations in just five city regions could 
provide enough land for as many homes as were built in the whole of 
England in the last 15 years
If Green Belt land and so-called ‘white land’ — that is land outside built-up areas 
but not allocated for development — within a short walk (800m) of a ‘commuter 
station’ serving a major city were made available, how much land could be 
released? And how many additional houses might that accommodate, still 
allowing generous retention of land for publicly-accessible green space?
This chapter sets out the answer to these questions for five major English city 
regions: Birmingham, Bristol, London, Manchester and Newcastle. 
In each case, the procedure of defining each city region started by identifying 
a station or stations to locate the employment centre of each city — the ‘entry 
stations’. Details of the employment centres’ entry stations are listed in Table 1.
03
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Table 1: Entry stations to for each city region
Number Station owner Station names
London 26 National Rail, Transport 
for London, future 
Crossrail
Peripheral stations 
within Zone 1 and Zone 
1-2 boundary
Bristol 1 National Rail only Temple Meads station
Birmingham 3 National Rail only New Street, Moor Street 
and Snow Hill stations
Manchester 5 National Rail, Metrolink Manchester Piccadilly, 
Oxford Road, Victoria, 
Cornbrook and New 
Islington stations
Newcastle 4 National Rail, Tyne and 
Wear Metro
Newcastle Central, 
Haymarket, Monument 
and St James stations
The next step was to identify all plausible ‘commuter stations’ serving each 
centre with a train suitable for commuting, taking no more than 45 minutes. To 
do this an algorithm was devised combining National Rail mobility data from the 
Rail Delivery Group supplemented with data from the Google Maps API, existing 
Metro and Tube timetables and future Crossrail services.
Outlying commuter stations were cross-checked against National Rail’s online 
Journey Planner for their travel times to entry stations. For local transport such as 
Tube or Metro, Google Maps or the relevant journey planner were consulted. So 
far as possible, all stations with trains that would not be suitable for commuting 
(e.g. services which have only one fast train service per day) were manually 
excluded. The ‘spider’ maps in Figure 1 show the final set of commuter stations 
within 45 minutes as points, where each cluster is colour-coded to show the city 
it serves. All entry stations are illustrated in red.
12
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Figure 1: Stations within 45 minutes or fewer of the five major  
English city regions
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Figure 2: Birmingham
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Figure 6: Newcastle
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For each of these commuter stations, land use within an 800m radius was 
extracted using parcel-based, pre-classified UK satellite imagery published by the 
Centre for Ecology and Hydrology.15 The 800m distance threshold is arbitrary but 
was chosen, as it is equivalent to a 10-minute walk. One could think of extending 
the radius to 1km or even to 2km if the developments were cycle-based with 
cycle parking at commuter stations as in the Netherlands. Such adjustments 
could in turn suggest reducing the 45-minute train service threshold to 40 
minutes. However, for the illustrative example in this paper the thresholds chosen 
are a radius of 800m and travel time of 45 minutes or fewer.
To produce the estimate of available land within walking distance of commuter 
stations two assumptions were made:
1. There would be no further building on land already classified as urban or 
even suburban. 
2. Any land with a recorded marker of public benefit would be excluded. 
Land of public benefit was interpreted to mean land with an identifiable 
scenic, historical, ecological, recreational or amenity value. This meant 
discarding seven land classifications: (i) Areas of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty; (ii) National Parks; (iii) Country Parks; (iv) Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest; (v) land under the protection of the National Trust 
or recorded by Historic England as a park or public garden; (vi) historic 
battlefields; and (vii) cemeteries as recorded by OpenStreetMap. These 
are represented in green on all maps. Finally, to ensure only land of little 
or no environmental or special scenic value was included, all land in 
the extracted satellite imagery classified as bog, unimproved or acidic 
grassland, or heathland was also discarded.
Noting the proviso about woodland below, the final results are a summary of all 
land that could be defined as ‘buildable’ if it were not for its designation as Green 
Belt or its use as intensive farmland. These results provide an estimate of all land 
within a 10-minute walk of a reasonably-connected station, on which there would 
be no obvious ecological or historical reasons to prevent new homes from  
being built.
The upshot is that buildable land, as identified here, is currently classified as 
intensive arable or horticultural land; ‘improved’ and ‘neutral’ grassland; and 
woodland whether broadleaf or coniferous. Woodland was included as buildable 
on the grounds that the proposal requires 10 per cent of the land be set aside as 
publicly-accessible green space; and managed woodland is very well suited for 
that purpose. In practice, most of the woodland identified near stations would 
remain as woodland but be managed as public green space.
15 Rowland, C.S.; Morton, R.D.; Carrasco, L.; McShane, G.; O’Neil, A.W.; Wood, C.M. (2017) ‘Land Cover Map 2015 (vector, GB)’,  
NERC Environmental Information Data Centre. https://doi.org/10.5285/6c6c9203-7333-4d96-88ab-78925e7a4e73
14
Centre for Cities • Homes on the right tracks • September 2019
Table 2: Buildable land around stations 
City region
Arable and 
horticulture Woodland Grassland Total
Birmingham 32% 13% 55% 100%
Bristol 16% 5% 79% 100%
London 19% 18% 63% 100%
Manchester 15% 26% 58% 100%
Newcastle 40% 21% 39% 100%
All city regions 22% 19% 59% 100%
Regional proportion
Outside Green Belts 18% 20% 61% 37%
Within Green Belts 23% 18% 58% 63%
Area of buildable land in hectares
City region
Arable and 
horticulture Woodland Grassland Total
Birmingham 1,875 727 3,184 5,786
Bristol 238 81 1,214 1,532
London 4,795 4,404 15,567 24,766
Manchester 1,681 2,896 6,400 10,977
Newcastle 1,517 809 1,479 3,805
All regions 10,106 8,917 27,844 46,867
 
Outside Green Belts 3,138 3,514 10,493 17,145
Within Green Belts 6,968 5,403 17,351 29,722
Table 2 above shows the estimates of all buildable land across all five city 
regions. The estimates are split by land class and Green Belt designation. In total 
there is nearly 47,000 hectares of buildable land. Most of this, 63 per cent, is 
presently designated as Green Belt although that proportion varies between the 
city regions. It is lower in Bristol and Newcastle because in those city regions a 
significant proportion of the land within 800m of the commuter stations is either 
in an AONB or a National Park, so not buildable. Although 63 per cent of the land 
would come from existing Green Belts that would represent only about 1.8 per 
cent of the current extent of Green Belts in England.
The different current uses of this buildable land are quite similar whether 
presently designated as Green Belt or not: over half is grassland, 61 per cent and 
58 per cent respectively. Across all regions, there is more land near stations that 
is classified as woodland outside of Green Belts. 
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How many houses this 47,000 hectares of land would accommodate depends on 
the assumption one makes about the density of development. Taking Northstowe 
— one of the largest current residential projects in England as illustrated in 
footnote 14 – as an example, then the low density is 35 to 40 dwellings per 
hectare and the medium 41-60.16 Based on these assumptions, calculating the 
number of houses at either 40 or 50 to the hectare implies that the total extra 
construction in the land identified for the five city regions could be between 
1,687,270 and 2,109,040 — about the number of all the houses built in the whole 
of England in the past 15 years. Since the current stock of dwellings in the whole 
of England is 24,172,00017 this would represent an increase of between 7 and 8.8 
per cent: and it is only calculated by applying the policy to five representative city 
regions. Moreover, these houses would be located where demand is greatest — 
within easy reach of jobs. 
Table 3 summarises the results for each of the five city regions and the following 
paragraphs outline how the proposal would work in each of them as well as 
its impact in more detail. In all maps, green indicates either ecologically or 
historically precious land, and fuchsia identifies all Green Belt land. A heat map is 
applied on identified commuter stations to highlight the extent of buildable land 
which is shown in black. 
Table 3: The total impact of green growth in the Green Belt
The next paragraphs will also show the revenues that would be produced for 
each city region if the proposed Land Development Charge were applied. This 
calculation requires making an assumption as to the average house price for the 
additional homes as well as about the number of dwellings the buildable land 
would provide. House prices are taken from the work done for Cheshire et al 
(2018) because these are the only prices known to have been estimated for city 
regions rather than government regions or local authorities.18 The price estimates 
were based on Land Registry data for the third quarter of 2016, and the total 
revenue yielded across the five city regions would have been around £100 billion.
16  https://www.scambs.gov.uk/media/8075/design-access-statement_lowres_part_6.pdf
17  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-dwelling-stock-including-vacants  
18 Cheshire, P., Hilber C. A. L. and Koster H. (2018) ‘Empty Homes, Longer Commutes: The Unintended Consequences of More 
Restrictive Local Planning’, Journal of Public Economics, 158, 126-51.
City 
region
Total buildable area New accessible 
green space 
(ha)
House 
prices 
(£)
Houses 
at 40 per 
ha
LDC 
revenue 
(£bn)
Houses 
at 50 
per ha
LDC 
revenue 
(£bn)
ha of which 
GB
Birmingham 5,786 72% 579 195,000 208,280 8.1 260,340 10.2
Bristol 1,532 24% 153 265,000 55,200 2.9 68,950 3.7
London 24,766 68% 2,477 370,000 891,600 66.0 1,114,500 82.5
Manchester 10,977 62% 1,098 152,000 395,200 12.0 494,000 15.0
Newcastle 3,805 40% 381 130,000 136,990 3.6 171,250 4.5
Total 46,867 63% 4,687 1,687,270 92.6 2,109,040 115.8
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Birmingham
Figure 2: Land in the Birmingham city region
There are 116 commuter stations within the Birmingham city region providing 
services to central Birmingham within 45 minutes. As Table 2 shows the total area 
of buildable land identified was 5,786 hectares. Allowing for 10 per cent of this 
buildable land to be devoted to publicly-accessible open space still leaves 5,207 
hectares for housing development. Assuming a density of 40 houses per hectare, 
this would enable the creation of 208,280 homes, generating some £8.1 billion in 
revenues. 
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Bristol
Figure 3: Land in the Bristol city region
There are 36 commuter stations within the Bristol city region providing services 
to central Bristol within 45 minutes. As Table 2 showed the total area of buildable 
land identified was 1,532 hectares. Allowing for 10 per cent of this buildable land 
to be devoted to publicly-accessible open space still leaves 1,379 hectares for 
housing development. Assuming a density of 40 houses per hectare, this would 
enable the creation of 55,200 homes, generating some £2.9 billion in revenues.
18
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London
Figure 4: Land in the London city region
As would be expected, London has more commuter stations within 45 minutes 
than any other city. There are 567 stations within the city region providing 
services to Zone 1 within 45 minutes. As Table 2 showed there is an estimated 
total of 24,766 hectares of buildable land within 800m of these stations. Again, 
assuming 10 per cent was reserved for new, accessible green space there would 
still be 22,289 hectares of land for housing. Assuming a density of 40 houses per 
hectare, this would enable the creation of 891,600 homes, generating some £66 
billion in revenues.
19
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Manchester
Figure 5: Land in the Manchester city region
In the Manchester city region, there are 242 qualifying commuter stations. The 
area of buildable land within 800m of them is shown in Table 2. There is a total 
of 10,977 hectares. On the same assumptions as before this would allow for 
1,098 hectares of new accessible green space but would still leave 9,879 for new 
housing development. Assuming a density of 40 houses per hectare, this would 
enable the creation of 395,200 homes, generating some £12 billion in revenues.
20
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Newcastle
Figure 6: Land in the Newcastle city region
In the Newcastle city region, there are 74 qualifying commuter stations. The 
area of buildable land within 800m of them is shown in Table 2. There is a total 
of 3,805 hectares. On the same assumptions as before this would allow for 381 
hectares of new, accessible green space but would still leave 3,424 hectares for 
new housing development. Assuming a density of 40 houses per hectare, this 
would enable the creation of 136,990 homes, generating some £3.6 billion in 
revenues.
Potentially buildable land
Entry stations
Newcastle commuter stations
Green Belt allocations
Land with recorded marker of public benefit
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Introducing a Land Development Charge to capture 
the increase in land values for social purposes
The extreme restriction on land supply for housing means that at present a 
price of £3 million to £7 million per hectare would be common for housing land 
with permission in most of southern England: at the fringes of London the price 
might be £17 million to £25 million per hectare. This compares with the price 
of agricultural land of some £20,000 per hectare.19 At present, this incredible 
windfall gain goes to the lucky landowner and is fully reflected in the cost of 
housing. If only the development arms of the rail companies had rights to develop 
the land, then they would be the only buyers willing to pay much more than the 
current use value; so the land would be available to them at a price not much 
more than its agricultural value.20 Out of this value uplift, the public subsidy to 
commuter rail could, over time, be replaced.
If local communities are really to welcome development, however, there 
needs to be a transparent and easy way to understand flow of substantial 
resources to offset for the costs that new development necessarily imposes. 
New development has very localised costs: there is noise, dirt and extra traffic 
during construction, some residents lose views to open land and there is extra 
pressure on local schools and roads when people move into the new houses. 
To compensate existing residents properly, there not only has to be enough 
revenue, but it needs to be safeguarded from ‘revenue equalisation’ (otherwise 
the funding ceases to be an incentive) and also from just filling holes in budgets, 
Treasury depredations or sometimes arbitrary local decisions. The simplest and 
most transparent instrument possible would be to introduce a Land Development 
Charge set at 20 per cent of the market price of all new development, commercial 
or residential, when it was sold.  
19  See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/land-value-estimates-for-policy-appraisal-2017
20  There might be an argument for powers of compulsory purchase – to be exercised by the GDCs – being available in the 
background although using them would cause delay and might cause legal issues revealed in a famous case, Myers vs. 
MKDC, heard in 1974.
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How would the new 
system work?
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Present methods of capturing any part of the increase in land values 
resulting from transport improvements or development permission are highly 
ineffective. As argued in Cheshire (2018), Section 106 agreements are very 
costly to negotiate and only worth doing with bigger developments and large 
local authorities with the necessary experience and skills.21 Of even larger 
developments — 100 to 999 houses — at most only 30 per cent involved a 
Section 106 Agreement and over the past four years only 15 per cent of all local 
authorities accounted for half of all Section 106-based affordable housing.22 
Worse, Section 106 Agreements introduce additional uncertainty into the 
development process — already a risky business since costs are upfront but 
returns are well into the future. This additional uncertainty forces developers to 
charge a higher risk premium meaning that otherwise viable developments cease 
to be worth doing. The result, therefore, is that fewer houses in total are built, 
reducing supply still further. The disadvantages of the Community Infrastructure 
Levy (CIL) are also well known.23 
If all existing charges, including planning obligations, such as Section 106 and 
CIL, were abolished but developers had to pay a 20 per cent charge on the sale 
price of all development, this would generate a very large flow of additional 
revenues. Table 3 showed that on reasonable assumptions this could yield 
over time a total of £100 billion compared to total local authority budgeted 
expenditure for 2015/16 on housing, planning and development of £2.89 billion. 
Since the figure for the total yield raised by the proposed Land Development 
Charge relates only to housing development but the proposal is to raise a similar 
charge on commercial development too, the actual yield would be significantly 
greater. 
It would be vital that, if such a Land Development Charge were imposed, the 
revenues it raised would be subject to absolutely clear and binding conditions: 
1. The same percentage rate would have to be charged in all locations and 
for all types of development. This would allow the resource allocating 
mechanism of the market to work effectively. If different places could 
charge whatever they wanted, as with CIL, then not only would this inject 
complexity into the idea, it would mean that rates could be manipulated 
(as with CIL) to discourage development or discourage developments of 
particular types.
2. Revenues raised from the Land Development Charge would be 
safeguarded from revenue equalisation schemes in order to retain the 
incentive effect of the charge. Any revenue going to local authorities 
should therefore not be counted as part of their income for the purposes 
of central government calculations.
21 Cheshire, P. (2018) ‘Broken market or broken policy? The unintended consequences of restrictive planning’, National Institute 
Economic Review, 245, August, R9-19. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90240/
22 MHCLG Live Table 1111
23 Cheshire, P. (2018) ‘Broken market or broken policy? The unintended consequences of restrictive planning’, National Institute 
Economic Review, 245, August, R9-19. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90240/
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3. Revenues raised by the Land Development Charge would have to be 
spent on just three activities: 
• Funding investment in any type of infrastructure to support the 
additional development and ensure the local community’s services 
are maintained at an equivalent or better level than before the new 
development. This spending could include for example: roads and 
other transport, health, education and training related facilities, 
strategic utilities infrastructure, green space or recreational 
facilities. The balance would vary according to the added load to 
existing infrastructure and services produced by building the new 
homes. One could imagine an Infrastructure Impact Statement along 
the lines of an Environmental Impact Statement being part of any 
proposal for housing developments exceeding 10 dwellings; 
• Funding social housing — whether funded directly or via social 
housing providers;
•  Funding the costs of running a body overseeing the collection and 
management of such charges. This should be strictly monitored and 
when the flow of funds started — it would take perhaps five years 
after its introduction for the new housing to start being sold — an 
upper limit on the proportion going to the overseeing body should  
be set.
The advantages of tying in the way in which the revenues for the Land 
Development Charge could be spent are that it would so far as possible retain the 
efficiency of the allocative process; it would compensate the local community 
by maintaining, even enhancing, the quality and quantity of local infrastructure; 
it would provide a substantial and steady flow of funding for social housing 
without the deadweight losses associated with Section 106; and it would assist 
developers by providing proper funding for the planning process and adequate 
infrastructure and a much simpler system to support development. In the present 
context, it would also provide a secure source of revenue to fund the body 
overseeing this new approach. 
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Establishing a Green Development Corporation for 
each city region
In order to facilitate and speed up the development of the newly-released land, it 
would be helpful to establish a Green Development Corporation (GDC) for each 
city region with full planning powers over the newly-released land and powers 
to spend the revenues from the proposed Land Development Charge for the 
designated purposes. The GDCs could not only ensure speedy development 
but also co-ordinate that development so that there was a coherent pattern of 
development for all the land in each region: not just station by station.
The London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) provides a good and 
successful example of how this can be achieved although it is not proposed that 
the GDCs — unlike the LDDC — should acquire the land for themselves, except 
that to be used for public or social purposes including the 10 per cent of the 
total area of buildable land reserved for new, public green space. As with the 
LDDC, the lifespans of the GDCs should be time limited after which their planning 
powers revert to the relevant local authorities.
As with any Urban Development Corporations, central government would need to 
establish the GDCs under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government. They could either be autonomous public corporations 
with their governing bodies nominated using the normal procedures; or there 
could be some guaranteed representation of those local authorities within the 
boundaries of which the buildable land was located. If that were decided on, then 
representation of local authorities could reflect how much of their land was being 
scheduled for development in each city region. However, once their governing 
bodies were constituted, the GDCs would be responsible for proactively working 
with both the relevant local authorities and the rail company’s development arms 
to agree planning guidelines for the land and ensure the development was rail 
focused with provision for cycle routes to the stations and cycle storage at them.
05
Conclusion
25
Centre for Cities • Homes on the right tracks • September 2019
The proposal is, then, to identify all the land within 800m of commuter stations 
to major cities that has no social, environmental, amenity or topographical 
reason for not being developed except that it is either designated as Green Belt 
or currently used for intensive agriculture. Commuter stations would have to have 
a service to the employment centre of 45 minutes or fewer. The amount of land 
that would be released for housing — even ensuring that 10 per cent of the total 
was reserved for new, accessible green space and just for the five city regions 
examined here — is enough to build between 1.7 million and 2.1 million new 
homes on: about the number of homes built in the whole of England over the past 
15 years. Still, because Green Belts cover such a vast area of land in total, some 
1,630,000 hectares or nearly 1.4 times the area of all existing development, this 
would cover only 1.8 per cent of the existing area of Green Belt. 
New developments would be compact with a focus on rail transport and cycling 
not just because of how it would be planned, but also because the owners of the 
stations would be ultimately the beneficiaries of this type of development. The 
proposal sets up a strong, inbuilt incentive to maximise the use of stations  
and rail.
To ensure that there was substantial public benefit from this (apart, of course, 
from all those extra houses in rail and cycle-based developments, in places giving 
easy access to jobs) the increase in land values would be used to:
1. Fund more and better local infrastructure for the local communities 
affected by the new development and more social housing
2. Provide a funding stream to replace all or most of the existing subsidies 
to commuter rail
Two new innovations would make this possible. The first would be to introduce 
a Land Development Charge set at 20 per cent of the realised sale price of all 
development. The second would be to gift the sole rights to develop the newly-
buildable land to new commercial development arms set up and owned by the 
current owners of the relevant stations — Metrolink, National Rail or Transport for 
London, for example. Since these new development arms of the station owners 
would have the sole right to develop the land, they would be the only entities able 
to pay above its existing use value. So they would be able to buy all the land at 
a reasonable mark-up over farmland prices. It might still be necessary to keep 
compulsory purchase powers in the background. Overseeing all this for each 
city region would be a special purpose GDC, modelled on the successful LDDC. 
The role of the GDC would be to ensure the development was co-ordinated 
and maintained high environmental standards and reserved plentiful land for 
additional green open space. Like the LDDC, the GDCs should have limited life-
spans with their planning powers reverting to the relevant local authorities at the 
end of the agreed period. They would be required to co-ordinate closely with both 
the local authorities within the boundaries of which the new development was 
located, and with the rail development companies.
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